Justice Samuel Alito, Becomes Captain Obvious!

During the oral arguments of Harris v. Quinn, Justice Alito made the obvious point that vote buying is what brought about the facts of this case.

That is, the executive order authorizing the State of Illinois to recognize a union for home-care providers was issued by the former Democratic Governor of Illinois, Rod Blagojevich, as payback to unions for their campaign contributions — for example, the SEIU contributed about $1.8 million to Blagojevich's two campaigns for governor in 2002 and 2006 —
    http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122973200003022963
    http://www.illinoispolicy.org/policy-points/process-for-unionizing-non-state-workers-raises-red-flags/

It is comical how the Solicitor General of the United States, Donald Verrilli, dodges this painfully obvious question.  Verrilli had repeatedly mentioned non-constitutional issues, like collective bargaining, in reference to the government having an interest in 'efficient and sound operations', but when Justice Scalia questioned these issues as not being the actual motive, and then Justice Alito questioned Verrilli on the campaign contributions that Blagojevich received from the union, suddenly Verrilli did not want to talk about the state's motives anymore.

After Alito mentioned that the union received $3.6 million dollars as a result of Blagojevich's executive order forcing more people to pay agency fees, Verrilli made the comment: 'I don't think it would be appropriate to look behind the legislature's action to consider and try to evaluate its motives.'

Of course, evaluating motives was exactly what Verrilli was trying to do with his earlier testimony — the whole point of what he was saying about what the State of Illinois had done regarding the union, was to make it look like the motive was sound, and only based on valid, practical considerations.

The U.S. Constitution certainly does not give the government permission to force people to support a private organization, so what else could Verrilli talk about?

And in this case, the motive is critical, because the actual motive, unlike the convoluted rationalizations Verilli was presenting to the court, gets to exactly what the bureaucrats were trying to accomplish — reward the union for its support, and help ensure future campaign contributions.

It is fascinating how ponderous the oral arguments on this case were, in that this key point only came up briefly and was quickly dismissed, even though it completely explains all the facts of this case.

As much as the term 'free rider' has been thrown around in regard to individuals who do not want to pay to support an organization like the SEIU, this case, and others like it, was never about free riders — Harris v. Quinn is about rent-seeking by the union and the corrupt politicians that collaborate with them at the public's expense.

The bulk of what has been said and written about this case is rationalization and propaganda to avoid this obvious fact.

Nothing about Harris v. Quinn was ever aimed at preventing people from joining a union, if they wished — and nothing about this ruling prevents individuals from doing so.  The Harris v. Quinn ruling just makes it a little harder for the unions to get contributions, since now they cannot use the state to force home-care workers to pay agency fees.

Now unions have to do it the 'hard' way — the moral way — they have to convince people to pay.

The obvious question here is not: 'Why shouldn't those who may benefit be forced to pay for what the union is doing?', but rather, 'Why should anyone be forced to pay for what the union is doing?'

The critical statements from an excerpt of the oral argument transcript are highlighted in italics below —

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http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_11_681

...
Donald B. Verrilli Jr: It hasn't, but the key point for us, the point of vital importance for the United States here, is that the Court continue to recognize the context, the First Amendment context of the government as manager of its own operations.

And whatever choice the United States has made, many States have made different choices in their role as manager of their own operations.

And under this Court's established case law, which Abood, I think, is a quite good example of, the principle that when the government is acting to further its operations as manager they get substantial latitude.

Now, there's a limit on that, of course.
They can't use that authority to -- they can't leverage that authority to affect the way citizens interact as citizens--

Justice Antonin Scalia: Of course, one can be skeptical about whether, when States do this they are doing it because it's more -- more efficient as an employer, because some States have tried to force private employers to have a closed shop, haven't they?

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: --Well, I think--

Justice Antonin Scalia: And there's no, you know, no State government interest in it.

There's just State interest in unions.

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: --Yes, but here we argue--

Justice Antonin Scalia: And unions getting a lot of money from people who don't belong in the unions.

So one can be skeptical about whether this is really what's going on, that the State really thinks it's going to be a lot easier if it has a closed shop.

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: --I guess what I would say about that, Justice Scalia, is that one could speculate about motives of States like Illinois, one could speculate about motives of the right to work States, but I would suggest that under our Federal system that States get to make those kinds of policy choices.

And Illinois has made a policy choice, as many private employers have, that using collective bargaining -- and it is, I want to stress here, very narrowly tailored collective bargaining.

By law, it can only be over wages, hours, and conditions of employment, by law.

Justice Samuel Alito: Do you think that the specific factual background of what occurred here provides a basis for skepticism about Illinois's reason for adopting this?

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: I don't think so.

When the legislation was enacted, it was enacted with a very large bipartisan margin, and I just don't think it would be appropriate in the context of the government as manager of its own operations to look behind and try to consider motive.

This is a choice that many--

Justice Samuel Alito: I thought the situation was that Government Blagojevich got a huge campaign contribution from the union and virtually as soon as he got into office he took out his pen and signed an executive order that had the effect of putting, what was it, $3.6 million into the union coffers?

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: --Whatever happened--

Justice Samuel Alito: That's the sequence; isn't that correct?

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: --Well, I think the issue before the Court is the constitutionality of the statute that was enacted subsequent to that by a large bipartisan majority, and I don't think it would be appropriate to look behind the legislature's action to consider and try to evaluate its motives.

And I think under our Federal system States get to make choices.
It's true not every State does it this way, but many do.

They do so for reasons of efficient management of their internal operations and that's the principle that we think is of critical importance here.

Justice Antonin Scalia: They may do so because of that reason.

You don't know what their reason is any more than I do.
All you can say is that that might be their reason.

Donald B. Verrilli Jr: And they ought to have the discretion to make that choice under this Court's case law.

That's our position with respect to that.
If I could make a point that I think is an important point about the free rider rationale under Abood.

There's been some suggestion that the point of the free rider rationale is to -- is to force the dissenters, the nonunion members to pay up.

I don't think that's the right way to understand the free rider point.

That once the State has imposed a duty of fair representation, then everybody's got an incentive to free ride, whether you're a union supporter or not, because by operation of law, you're going to get the benefit.

It's just a classic logic of collective action problem.
...

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This case, and especially the oral arguments and statements, act as a litmus test of one's intellectual honesty.

Contemplate the implications of this bizarre statement from Verilli: 'They ought to have the discretion to make that choice under the Court's case law.'

Verilli did not make that comment in reference to a group of bureaucrats choosing what color to paint an office building, or where to locate a military base — or any other operational decision that does not by necessity violate individual rights — his claim is that bureaucrats should be free to force individuals to pay fees to an organization they don't want to support — an organization which is a massive contributor to political candidates — under the absurd pretext that the coercion is required to protect the people being forced to pay the fees.

How on earth is it justified that the state has the free choice to use the lives of its citizens in this way.

Verilli has turned the proper definition of government on its head.  As stated in the Declaration of Independence, just government power requires the consent of the governed —

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Declaration_of_Independence
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

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What can you say about the character of an individual who casually advocates before the highest court, for initiating force against individuals in this way?

What can you say about the character of an individual who advocates for government bureaucrats to have the choice to force someone to pay fees to an organization, knowing that organization pays support to the bureaucrats making that decision?

And how did unions get this reputation for being critical to 'efficient management', using Verilli's phrase, when unions have been notorious for inefficiency for decades?

Even the most famous Democrat, Franklin D. Roosevelt, wrote that collective bargaining is not appropriate for government employees.   http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15445

The reason should be obvious, since it is an obvious conflict of interest, given that the purpose of unions has always been to extract as much of the profit from an employer as they can, but in this case, the employer is elected by workers, and the cost of any contract is borne by the taxpayer.

So it is not even appropriate for employees on the state payroll to participate in collective bargaining, never mind individuals who are caring for family members in their own homes.

Here is a portion of Roosevelt's letter on this, written in 1937 —

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http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15445

112 - Letter on the Resolution of Federation of Federal Employees Against Strikes in Federal Service
August 16, 1937

My dear Mr. Steward:

As I am unable to accept your kind invitation to be present on the occasion of the Twentieth Jubilee Convention of the National Federation of Federal Employees, I am taking this method of sending greetings and a message.
...
All Government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.

Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employees. Upon employees in the Federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government activities. This obligation is paramount. Since their own services have to do with the functioning of the Government, a strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable. It is, therefore, with a feeling of gratification that I have noted in the constitution of the National Federation of Federal Employees the provision that "under no circumstances shall this Federation engage in or support strikes against the United States Government.
...

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The War on Honesty

The opinion piece, 'The War on Workers', published in the New York Times on July 2, 2014, has the usual fallacies regarding the recent Supreme Court decision, Harris v. Quinn.

Here are a few of the main premises from the piece --
  1. The plaintiffs in the case are employees of the state -- the authors refer to them as 'public employees' and  'co-workers' and describe them as receiving meager benefits, implying the plaintiffs have exactly the same status as others who voted for union representation.
  2. Majority rule is a valid basis for forcing people to pay to support a union -- the authors claim that if a majority of workers vote for a union, it's appropriate to force everyone in the field to pay that union.
  3. Unions are unconditionally good -- the authors give no consideration to the harm that union participation can cause, and claim that non-members are free riding if they are not forced to pay fees to the union.  The authors also state that 'everyone suffers, if the union cannot afford to represent workers.'

Premise 1 is obviously false -- a number of the plaintiffs are caring for family members in their own homes, and are not in any way in what constitutes an 'employer-employee' relationship.   They certainly don't have benefits packages, or have any interaction with so-called co-workers, as stated by the authors.

And premise 1 is especially absurd, given that the majority opinion gave emphasis to the pains the legislature of the State of Illinois went to, to distinguish the personal assistants from state employees -- precisely so the state would not have to give them the benefits received by full-fledged employees (see page 23 of the decision, for example).

Premise 2 is also obviously false  -- this isn't even true for employees of a single company with a standard employment contract.  There's nothing that justifies forcing dissenters to pay for union activities, even if the ridiculous assumption were true that unions always help every member.

An organization has no right to exist, if any of its members did not join it voluntarily.

Nothing gives an organization the moral right to force payment for services from individuals, for services those individuals specifically stated that they do not want, regardless of how valuable those services may be.

Premise 3 is laughably absurd.  It's fascinating that people will attempt to use such a blatantly false assumption as justification for initiating force against others.  Even if it could be proven without any doubt that union membership would benefit a particular individual, that individual has every right to refuse the cost, on the sole basis that it isn't worth it to them.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/opinion/ruling-on-harris-v-quinn-is-a-blow-for-unions.html

...
Though its decision in Harris v. Quinn was narrow, saying that, in some cases, unions could not collect fees from one particular class of public employees who did not want to join, its language suggests that this may be the court’s first step toward nationalizing the “right to work” gospel by embedding it in constitutional law.

The petitioners in Harris were several home-care workers who did not want to join a union, though a majority of their co-workers had voted in favor of joining one. Under Illinois law, they were still required to contribute their “fair share” to the costs of representation — a provision, known as an “agency fee,” that is prohibited in “right to work” states.

The ability of unions to collect an agency fee reflects a constitutional balance that has governed American labor for some 40 years: Workers can’t be forced to join a union or contribute to its political and ideological activities, but they can be required to pay for the cost of the union’s collective bargaining and contract-administration activities.

The majority in Harris saw things differently. Making workers pay anything to a union they oppose is in tension with their First Amendment rights — “something of an anomaly,” in the words of the majority. But the real anomaly lies in according dissenters a right to refuse to pay for the union’s services — services that cost money to deliver, and that put money in the pockets of all employees.
...

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'"Right to work" gospel'?   How about the right to be free from coercion.

Notice this denigrating language implies that the conviction that one has a right to accept employment, without being forced to join an organization, never mind being forced to pay fees to that organization, is some kind of faith based viewed that isn't grounded in the fundamental individual right to be left alone.

And the last sentence in the paragraph quoted above is absolutely bizarre --

'But the real anomaly lies in according dissenters a right to refuse to pay for the union's services -- services that cost money to deliver, and that put money in the pockets of all employees.'

How on earth did unions acquire this exalted and totally anomalous status, that they alone can charge individuals for services, even when those individuals specifically asked to be excluded, and it is just assumed that benefits flow without question?  Think of all the other corporations that would love to be treated this way -- they could go around rendering services without requests, or, in this case, after having been specifically asked not to, and the government would force payments from the affected individuals.  No more trying to be competitive, or even to do anything useful, since the government will force individuals to be customers.

This quote from the article states the ultimate motivation of the authors -- it's surprising that they state their contempt for workers so clearly --

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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/opinion/ruling-on-harris-v-quinn-is-a-blow-for-unions.html

...
Once selected by a majority of workers in a bargaining unit, a union becomes the exclusive representative, with a duty to fairly represent all of them. That is the bedrock of our public and private sector labor laws.

Unless everyone is required to pay for those services, individual workers can easily become “free riders,” taking the benefits of collective representation without paying their fair share of the costs. Not only dissenters but any employee who wants to save a buck can “free ride.” The net result may be that the union cannot afford to represent workers effectively, and everyone suffers.

Consider the home-care providers at issue in Harris. These workers, who are in one of the fastest-growing and lowest-paid occupations in America, are generally employed solely by individual customers, even when their wages came from public funds like Medicaid. Alone, they were stuck with low pay and meager benefits, and states faced labor shortages and high turnover.
...

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Notice that if the services that unions are providing are so valuable, most workers would pay voluntarily, and the unions would not have to use force to get them to do so -- people would be fighting to get in a union, rather than fighting for their right to stay out.

The ultimate contempt for workers is expressed in the quote above, in that the essential meaning is that workers are too stupid to see what's in their best interest, in that they will suffer, if they are not forced to pay union dues.

So there you have it.  They have to control you -- it's for your own good.

But this is an obvious self-contradiction, since the union is controlled by it's members (at least that's the premise).  It begs the obvious question, 'So how are a group of workers, that are too stupid to join an organization that serves their best interests and is obviously so valuable, going to run that organization with any effectiveness once they join?'

But more importantly, the issue of 'free riding' that has been raised repeatedly in cases like Harris v. Quinn is just a red herring fallacy in this context.  The only critical point is whether the right of individuals to be free from coercion is being protected -- not whether individuals are supporting some organization that may be providing a valuable service, since individuals certainly have every right not to do that.

Organizations do not fail because of too many 'free riders' -- they fail because too few people are convinced it is in their interests to pay to support them.

Even using the term 'free riding' in this context begs the obvious question: 'How is it even possible that there are no dissenters that are not worse off as a result of union activities.'

Using the term 'free riding' with regard to dissenters treats union activities as if their value is beyond question.

There's also another glaring fallacy in all of these hyperbolic claims about union services, and their supposed unquestionable value -- a union can just as easily represent a small group of individuals as a large one in 'collective representation'.

There's nothing magical about 'collective representation' that requires the participation of every single individual in a particular field to make a union viable.  Indeed, when union representatives are engaged in collective bargaining, the number of employees they're bargaining for is not relevant, and has no bearing on the things the union should be doing to represent the membership, however large or small.

The union isn't spending on a per employee basis to negotiate an agreement that covers a group, and the dissenters that don't want union services can just as easily be excluded from the negotiation and left to come to their own agreement with an employer.  Negotiating an agreement for a group is the same, whether the group contains one hundred, or one million members -- the whole point is that all the individuals in the group will be subject to the same terms (treated as a single unit) -- collective bargaining would be impossible if this were not the case.  That is, this 'all or none' claim that keeps getting repeated regarding union participation is absurd on it face.

The obvious problem for unions, that no one is willing to name, is that unions lose influence when the membership drops, because they can't do as much damage to an employer -- not that unions lose money to so-called 'free riders'.

All of these fallacious arguments that are being thrown out in an attempt to make it look unfair not to force dissenters to pay unions, are rationalizations to disguise the desire to give unions more power.

To that point, notice this perversely fascinating closing statement from the authors of 'The War on Workers' --

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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/opinion/ruling-on-harris-v-quinn-is-a-blow-for-unions.html

...
Unions are already reeling. At a time when workers are losing economic ground, we should be looking for ways to strengthen their ability to join with co-workers and bargain collectively to improve their lot. Instead, the court in Harris sided with those who seek to weaken it further.

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This is a total non sequitur.  Nothing about Harris v. Quinn weakens the ability of workers to unionize.

The decision to prevent forced payments to unions from workers, in no way prevents workers from joining a union, if they wish.  What a comically asinine comment to make, regarding a case that was brought by individuals in order to get a union organization to leave them alone.

The Harris v. Quinn decision gives workers more freedom and control -- not less.

Harris v. Quinn

On June 30, 2014 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling, decided the case of Harris v. Quinn --
    http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/11-681_j426.pdf

From the decision document --

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"ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined."

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The court held that the First Amendment prohibits the collection of an agency fee from Rehabilitation Program Personal Assistants (PAs) who do not want to join or support a union.

The case is fascinating in that it has generated so much controversy, while at the same time being so simple in its facts.

The group of plaintiffs included individuals like Pam Harris, who care for a disabled family member at home, and who receive a subsidy from a Medicaid-waiver program to do so.

Here's the basic description of the program from the majority opinion in the decision document --

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http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/11-681_j426.pdf

...
   Millions of Americans, due to age, illness, or injury, are unable to live in their own homes without assistance and are unable to afford the expense of in-home care.  In order to prevent these individuals from having to enter a nursing home or other facility, the federal Medicaid program funds state-run programs that provide in-home services to individuals whose conditions would otherwise require institutionalization. See 42 U. S. C. §1396n(c)(1).  A State that adopts such a program receives federal funds to compensate persons who attend to the daily needs of individuals needing in-home care.  Ibid.; see also 42 CFR §§440.180, 441.300–441.310 (2013).  Almost every State has established such a program.  See Dept. of Health and  Human Services, Understanding Medicaid Home and Community Services: A Primer (2010).

   One of those States is Illinois, which has created the Illinois Department of Human Services Home Services Program, known colloquially as the state “Rehabilitation Program.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 20, §2405/3(f) (West 2012); 89 Ill. Admin. Code §676.10 (2007).  “[D]esigned to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals who may instead be satisfactorily maintained at home at a lesser cost to the State,” §676.10(a), the Rehabilitation Program allows participants to hire a “personal assistant” who provides homecare services tailored to the individual’s needs. Many of these personal assistants are relatives of the person receiving care, and some of them provide care in their own homes.  See App. 16–18.

   Illinois law establishes an employer-employee relationship between the person receiving the care and the person providing it.  The law states explicitly that the person receiving home care—the “customer”—“shall be the em­ployer of the [personal assistant].”  89 Ill. Admin. Code §676.30(b) (emphasis added). A “personal assistant” is defined as “an individual employed by the customer to provide . . . varied services that have been approved by the customer’s physician,” §676.30(p) (emphasis added), and the law makes clear that Illinois “shall not have control or input in the employment relationship between the cus­tomer and the personal assistants.” §676.10(c).
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In no way is Pam Harris, or any of the other plaintiffs in her situation, an employee of the state, or even an employee at all, so it's a complete non-sequitur to claim that she is any way represented by a union --
     http://www.illinoispolicy.org/a-moms-fight-for-justice-harris-v-quinn/

Of course, that didn't stop many people from making that argument.

From economics, the idea of 'Free Riding' is typically used as the basis for that argument.  For example, it's not hard to find articles similar to this one, written by Nina Totenburg, the award winning NPR reporter --

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http://www.npr.org/2014/01/21/264257440/illinois-case-brings-new-union-questions-to-supreme-court

...
No one is forced to join the union, but non-union members — and there are three in this case — do have to pay the costs of negotiating and administering the contract. Under long-established labor law, when a majority of workers approve a union, those who do not join cannot be forced to pay for political activities of the union. But if the union is accepted by the state, as it was in Illinois, non-members still have to pay their fair share of the expenses of negotiating a contract. That's to prevent them from free-riding on the dues of members.
...

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It's perversely fascinating that someone would make a reference to free riding in regard to contract negotiations, when this case deals with one or more individuals who are not employees and do not have an employment contract with anyone.  That the state regulates the minimum qualifications for PAs doesn't alter this fact -- anyone who can prove that they have the minimum competence required to perform as a PA can care for a disabled family member -- they don't need formal employment with the state at a negotiated salary to do so.

Claiming the plaintiffs in this case are employees of the state, is equivalent to saying that all licensed taxi drivers, that are paid by a disabled person to transport them with Medicaid funds, are also employees of the state, because they had to pass a driving test administered by the state, and their qualifications as a driver are subject to periodic state review.

A more relevant question here is: 'Why is a union organization, that represents state employees, trying to force payments from individuals, for something those individuals don't want, and that the union did not, and could not, provide?'

And note the false distinction Nina makes in the quote above regarding so-called 'fair share' fees --

'No one is forced to join the union, but non-union members do have to pay the costs of negotiating and administering the contract.'

This is a distinction without a difference -- that is, what's the difference between being forced to pay fees to a union, and being forced to become a member?

But there is an important difference, and it makes the situation even worse for individuals who don't want to deal with a union organization.  By only paying the so-called 'fair share' fees, individuals aren't considered union members, so they have no say regarding union activities.

So, the 'fair share' fees are not fair at all, in that they force individuals to pay for something they have specifically stated they don't want (since they didn't want to join the union to begin with), while at the same time removing their ability to express any say in union activities.

Now that's what I call free riding, it's just that it's the unions doing the riding.

What a deal for the unions -- having government force the payment of fees from individuals who don't want to be represented by the organization, while at the same time allowing them to deny those individuals any say regarding the organization's activities.

King George would have blushed.

Of course, union supporters are quick to point out supposed benefits everyone in a unionized field receives from union activities, while ignoring the harm that unions cause, and how union influence has been critical in the failure of certain companies, like Hostess --
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Featherbedding
   http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/11/28/more-hostess-liquidation-to-come-micro-unions/

Well, someone did originally get this issue right.  In 1961 the U.S. Supreme Court delivered a 7-2 ruling for the case International Association of Machinists v. Street.  In this ruling, the Court held that it is NOT unconstitutional for unions to collect fees from dissenting nonmembers, but only to perform bargaining duties.

Of course, union organizers loved that decision, but notice this statement from Hugo Black, one of the dissenting judges in Machinists v. Street --

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http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16218813564309818799
http://supreme-court-cases.findthebest.com/l/1768/International-Association-Of-Machinists-v-Street

...
Unions composed of a voluntary membership, like all other voluntary groups, should be free in this country to fight in the public forum to advance their own causes, to promote their choice of candidates and parties and to work for the doctrines or the laws they favor. But to the extent that Government steps in to force people to help espouse the particular causes of a group, that group— whether composed of railroad workers or lawyers—loses its status as a voluntary group. The reason our Constitution endowed individuals with freedom to think and speak and advocate was to free people from the blighting effect of either a partial or a complete governmental monopoly of ideas. Labor unions have been peculiar beneficiaries of that salutary constitutional principle, and lawyers, I think, are charged with a peculiar responsibility to preserve and protect this principle of constitutional freedom, even for themselves. A violation of it, however small, is, in my judgment, prohibited by the First Amendment and should be stopped dead in its tracks on its first appearance. With so vital a principle at stake, I cannot agree to the imposition of parsimonious limitations on the kind of decree the courts below can fashion in their efforts to afford effective protection to these priceless constitutional rights.
...

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Notice his statement that any violation of the freedoms described by the First Amendment 'should be stopped dead in its tracks on its first appearance.'

Obviously, that didn't happen, but at least the recent decision on Harris v. Quinn is a move in the right direction.

I'm so happy that I've never worked in a field dominated by unions.