Saturday, October 24, 2015

John Howard's Lie

John Howard was the 25th Prime Minister of Australia, serving from March 1996 to December 2007.

On April 28, 1996, six weeks after Howard was elected Prime Minister of Australia, Martin Bryant shot and killed 35 people and wounded 23 others, at Port Arthur, Tasmania.

Soon after that shooting, the Australian government under Howard, passed the 'National Firearms Agreement', which included Australia's 1996 gun buyback program, which was reported to cost about $500 million taxpayer dollars, with $340 million going to gun owners, in compensation for surrendering the firearms banned by the new law —
     http://archive.is/eG33a
     https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net616/f/anao_report_1997-98_25.pdf,   http://archive.is/vS8rj (p. 7)
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_buyback_program#Australia
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_laws_in_Australia#Port_Arthur_massacre_and_its_consequences

In two previous posts I pointed out that the Australian gun buyback had no impact in saving lives.  Gun homicides in Australia decreased after the ban, but were already decreasing years before the buyback started in 1996.  And gun suicides in Australia started a long steady downtrend from almost 10 years prior in 1986, but the overall suicide rate in Australia actually increased after the gun buyback began in 1996, because the non-firearm suicide rate was increasing, and Australians do not normally use a gun to commit suicide —
     http://maxautonomy.blogspot.com/2014/06/prohibitions-or-pretending-human-nature.html
     http://maxautonomy.blogspot.com/2015/10/you-have-to-lie-to-support-gun-control.html

Here is a study from October 2006, by two Australian academics, Jeanine Baker and Samara McPhedran, entitled 'GUN LAWS AND SUDDEN DEATH, Did the Australian Firearms Legislation of 1996 Make a Difference?', which documents these same points.

Included below are two charts from the Baker/McPhedran study, showing the Australian suicide and homicide rates for the 93 year period from 1910 to 2003.  Notice that the Port Arthur shootings created an outlier in the historical trend, just as other incidents had in previous years.

Baker/McPhedran point out that retaining outliers (like the homicide count from the 1996 Port Arthur Massacre) artificially elevates the changes in the homicide rate in the time series data, and that the 1996 data point should be thrown out for the purposes of evaluating the effect of Australia's NFA — not to mention that the gun buyback was not even completed until 1997.  But they did not eliminate the 1996 homicide count from their study to avoid the appearance of bias.

I added the red 'Port Arthur Shooting' label to the chart below to make that data point more obvious (the label was not on the original chart in the study) —

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40534/1/MPRA_paper_40534.pdf
http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/GunLawsSudden%20DeathBJC.pdf
http://moveleft.org/dog_ban/br_j_criminology_2006_.pdf
http://archive.is/uZCg4

Australian Suicide/Homicide Rates, 1910-2003, Baker, McPhedran study

GUN LAWS AND SUDDEN DEATH
Did the Australian Firearms Legislation of 1996 Make a Difference?
Jeanine Baker and Samara McPhedran
...
Methods
...
A methodological caution is necessary.  In 1996, the firearm homicide rate was high due to the murder of 35 people in one shooting event.  As a consequence, mistakenly using 1996, rather than 1997, as a start point for evaluating changes in the rate of firearm deaths post-NFA would alter the conclusions drawn.  Likewise, the retention of the 1996-elevated figure, along with outliers identified in firearm homicide, artificially elevates the change in rates for the pre-NFA time series.  This has important implications for future investigations and it is recommended that subsequent research into the impacts of firearms legislation take into account the importance of screening for outliers and using appropriate, consistent grouping methods.

Outliers in this study were identified using the ARIMA residual values calculated from examining the data from 1979 to 2004 for each sudden death category.  Years in which the residual values differed from the mean residual value by more than twice the standard deviation were assumed to be outliers (Table 1).  However, given the polarization that can occur in the debate about firearm legislation, outliers in this study were not eliminated lest such actions be construed as being used in order to make the argument that the NFA failed to influence sudden death by firearm even more compelling.
...

Conclusions
Examination of the long-term trends indicated that the only category of sudden death that may have been influenced by the introduction of the NFA was firearm suicide.  However, this effect must be considered in light of the findings for suicide (non-firearm).  Homicide patterns (firearm and non-firearm) were not influenced by the NFA, the conclusion being that the gun buy-back and restrictive legislative changes had no influence on firearm homicide in Australia.  The introduction of the NFA appeared to have a negative effect on accidental firearm death.  However, over the time period investigated, there was a relatively small number of accidental deaths per annum, with substantial variability.  Any conclusions regarding the effect of the NFA on accidental firearm death should be approached with caution.
...

However, the NFA was not only directed at buying back semi-automatic longarms and pump action shotguns, despite 643,726 firearms being handed in for destruction.  Additional legislation introduced concurrently across Australia as part of the NFA related to tightening the criteria for ‘genuine need’ and purpose of use, enforcing safe storage of firearms and ammunition, and mandatory training and reporting.  Thus, the efficacy of these additional restrictions should also be considered in light of policies designed to reduce overall firearm deaths in one or more of the sudden death categories.  Examination of the sudden death categories presented here indicates that evidence for such overall reductions is tenuous at best, with only firearm suicide rates post-NFA being significantly different from those predicted from the observed rates.

However, suicide rates by firearm pre- and post-NFA both showed decline.  Without considering the general trends in suicide within Australia for this time period, the conclusion would have been that the 1996 NFA had succeeded in lowering firearm suicide rates.  However, immediately following the NFA, suicide (non-firearm) increased.  This would suggest that there may have been an initial period during which method substitution occurred, although it seems improbable that a buy-back focusing on semi-automatic longarms and pump action shotguns would prevent access to firearms for anyone intent on suicide.  It is possible that the increased scrutiny of licence applicants and the necessity for safe storage would cause those considering acquiring a firearm to attempt suicide to evaluate other methods and may subsequently have led some individuals to seek alternative methods of suicide recognized as approximately as lethal as firearms (particularly, hanging).
...


Quoted below is an article at nytimes.com, from January 2013 (written 7 years after the Baker/McPhedran study quoted above), by the former Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, entitled 'I Went After Guns. Obama Can, Too.'.

Of course, it is not surprising that Howard would pretend that legislation he championed has been responsible for saving many lives, even though there is no indication that this is true.  And notice that Howard made no attempt to hide his view that the citizens of Australia should be subordinated to bureaucrats such as himself when he wrote —
       http://archive.is/4h0Xi
Australia, correctly in my view, does not have a Bill of Rights, so our legislatures have more say than America’s over many issues of individual rights, and our courts have less control.
And anyone who believes that someone like Barack Obama or the U.S. Congress — or any government bureaucrat for that matter — needs encouragement to violate individual rights, is not paying attention.

John Howard closes his ridiculous article by pretending that there is now wide consensus that Australia's 'National Firearms Agreement' reduced both gun-related homicide and suicide rates.  He also wrote that gun-related murders and suicides fell sharply after 1996.  And so they did — just like they were falling years before the buyback.  And, of course, gun-related murders fell dramatically the moment the Port Arthur Massacre ended, since that Massacre accounted for over 35% of the homicides that year (35 of 99 total, Baker/McPhedran).

That is, the Port Arthur Massacre was an extreme anomaly.  One has to go all the way back to 1928 and the Coniston Massacre, to find an incident in Australia where the homicide count from a massacre was higher than that of the Port Arthur massacre in 1996 — and the Coniston Massacre involved a dispute with indigenous Australians (it was not a shooting rampage by a lone gunman).  If the death count from the Port Arthur massacre had been no higher than the highest among the 13 that John Howard mentioned at the close of his article (8), the firearm homicide rate in Australia would have gone up slightly after the NFA gun buyback.

In 1997 Australia's total firearm homicide count was 75 — so if 8 is used for the Port Arthur homicide count (the highest homicide count in the 13 prior massacres from 1996 back to 1978), giving a total of 72 firearm homicides in 1996, Australia's firearm homicide rate actually increased immediately after the gun buyback.  Here is how Australia's homicides rates compare in 1997, when the Port Arthur homicides are reduced in the 1996 homicide count —
  • 1996 Population = 18,310,714, Firearm Homicides = 99 : rate 0.541 per/100,000 (original total)
  • 1996 Population = 18,310,714, Firearm Homicides = 72 : rate 0.393 per/100,000 (less 27 Port Arthur homicides)
  • 1997 Population = 18,517,564, Firearm Homicides = 75 : rate 0.405 per/100,000
The point here is not that we should just be able to ignore any large homicide count — the point is, that this claim that Australia's NFA 'reduced the gun-related homicide rate', as John Howard states below in his article, depends on the assumption that the completely anomalous death count from the Port Arthur Massacre was eliminated by the new legislation — but it is hard to find an event like the Port Arthur Massacre anywhere in Australia's history, so there was never a reason to expect such a massacre to happen again by 2013 (when John Howard wrote his article), if ever, even if the Australian government made no changes to their laws after the Port Arthur Massacre.

In short, the claim that a massacre resembling Port Arthur would have happened again had Australia's NFA not been passed is obviously false, since the Port Arthur Massacre was such a rare event.  In that regard, consider this quote from the study, 'Australia: A Massive Buy back of Low-Risk Guns' [emphasis added] —
      http://archive.is/fbrPW
...
Homicides continued a modest decline; taking into account the one-time effect of the Port Arthur massacre itself, the share of murders committed with firearms declined sharply.  Other violent crime, such as armed robbery, continued to increase, but again with fewer incidents that involved firearms.  This relatively small effect is hardly surprising given that the type of firearms prohibited had not previously been used frequently in crime or suicide, as well as the low power of the potential tests, with less than five years of postban data.  However, the principal goal of the intervention was ending the mass murders; in the five years since the buyback, there has been a modest reduction in the severity of these murders, and none have involved firearms, though the frequency of these events is so low that not much can be inferred from this occurrence.
...
Well, of course — no one should have expected much of an affect from Australia's NFA and its gun buyback, because the guns that were banned and purchased were not used to commit crimes or suicide to begin with.

And do not forget that Australia's overall suicide rate increased immediately after the gun buyback, since committing suicide with a firearm has never been the preferred method in Australia.  And the firearm suicide rate was in a downtrend for almost 10 years before the NFA was enacted — as clearly shown by the chart included above from the Baker/McPhedran study.  So unless you think that somehow everyone is better off, as long as people commit suicide without using a firearm, saying Australia's NFA reduced firearm suicides is meaningless.  Obviously, only the total number of suicides is important.

Of course, those who wish to pretend that they are champions of morality and saving human lives, will never stop pretending that the restrictions they create (like Australia's NFA) are an unqualified positive, regardless of how much they must misrepresent the evidence to defend that view.


http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/opinion/australia-banned-assault-weapons-america-can-too.html
http://archive.is/4h0Xi

I Went After Guns. Obama Can, Too.
By John Howard   JAN. 16, 2013
SYDNEY, Australia

IT is for Americans and their elected representatives to determine the right response to President Obama’s proposals on gun control.  I wouldn’t presume to lecture Americans on the subject.  I can, however, describe what I, as prime minister of Australia, did to curb gun violence following a horrific massacre 17 years ago in the hope that it will contribute constructively to the debate in the United States.

I was elected prime minister in early 1996, leading a center-right coalition.  Virtually every nonurban electoral district in the country — where gun ownership was higher than elsewhere — sent a member of my coalition to Parliament.

Six weeks later, on April 28, 1996, Martin Bryant, a psychologically disturbed man, used a semiautomatic Armalite rifle and a semiautomatic SKS assault weapon to kill 35 people in a murderous rampage in Port Arthur, Tasmania.

After this wanton slaughter, I knew that I had to use the authority of my office to curb the possession and use of the type of weapons that killed 35 innocent people.  I also knew it wouldn’t be easy.

Our challenges were different from America’s.  Australia is an even more intensely urban society, with close to 60 percent of our people living in large cities.  Our gun lobby isn’t as powerful or well-financed as the National Rifle Association in the United States.  Australia, correctly in my view, does not have a Bill of Rights, so our legislatures have more say than America’s over many issues of individual rights, and our courts have less control.  Also, we have no constitutional right to bear arms.  (After all, the British granted us nationhood peacefully; the United States had to fight for it.)

Because Australia is a federation of states, the national government has no control over gun ownership, sale or use, beyond controlling imports.  Given our decentralized system of government, I could reduce the number of dangerous firearms only by persuading the states to enact uniform laws totally prohibiting the ownership, possession and sale of all automatic and semiautomatic weapons while the national government banned the importation of such weapons.

To make this plan work, there had to be a federally financed gun buyback scheme.  Ultimately, the cost of the buyback was met by a special one-off tax imposed on all Australians.  This required new legislation and was widely accepted across the political spectrum.  Almost 700,000 guns were bought back and destroyed — the equivalent of 40 million guns in the United States.

City dwellers supported our plan, but there was strong resistance by some in rural Australia.  Many farmers resented being told to surrender weapons they had used safely all of their lives.  Penalizing decent, law-abiding citizens because of the criminal behavior of others seemed unfair.  Many of them had been lifelong supporters of my coalition and felt bewildered and betrayed by these new laws.  I understood their misgivings.  Yet I felt there was no alternative.

The fundamental problem was the ready availability of high-powered weapons, which enabled people to convert their murderous impulses into mass killing.  Certainly, shortcomings in treating mental illness and the harmful influence of violent video games and movies may have played a role.  But nothing trumps easy access to a gun.  It is easier to kill 10 people with a gun than with a knife.

Passing gun-control laws was a major challenge for my coalition partner: the rural, conservative National Party.  All of its members held seats in nonurban areas.  It was also very hard for the state government of Queensland, in Australia’s northeast, where the National Party was dominant, and where the majority of the population was rural.

The leaders of the National Party, as well as the premier of Queensland, courageously supported my government’s decision, despite the electoral pain it caused them.  Within a year, a new populist and conservative political party, the One Nation Party, emerged and took many votes from our coalition in subsequent state and federal elections; one of its key policies was the reversal of the gun laws.

For a time, it seemed that certain states might refuse to enact the ban.  But I made clear that my government was willing to hold a nationwide referendum to alter the Australian Constitution and give the federal government constitutional power over guns.  Such a referendum would have been expensive and divisive, but it would have passed.  And all state governments knew this.

In the end, we won the battle to change gun laws because there was majority support across Australia for banning certain weapons.  And today, there is a wide consensus that our 1996 reforms not only reduced the gun-related homicide rate, but also the suicide rate.  The Australian Institute of Criminology found that gun-related murders and suicides fell sharply after 1996.  The American Law and Economics Review found that our gun buyback scheme cut firearm suicides by 74 percent.  In the 18 years before the 1996 reforms, Australia suffered 13 gun massacres — each with more than four victims — causing a total of 102 deaths.  There has not been a single massacre in that category since 1996.

Few Australians would deny that their country is safer today as a consequence of gun control.



Sunday, October 18, 2015

You Have To Lie To Support Gun Control

In a previous post, I wrote about the ridiculous premise that human behavior could be suddenly and dramatically changed by some new piece of legislation passed by a particular government —
     http://maxautonomy.blogspot.com/2014/06/prohibitions-or-pretending-human-nature.html

It is absolutely bizarre how people will enter into discussions over and over again about some piece of legislation, as if somehow, magically, that legislation will dramatically reduce, or completely eliminate, some undesirable human behavior.

As an obvious example, that post used Australia's gun buyback program, which was instituted as part of Australia's 'National Firearms Agreement' in 1996 (https://archive.is/eG33a).

Since the Australian legislation had no impact in saving lives — gun homicides decreased after the ban, but were already in a steady downtrend from years before, and the overall suicide rate increased immediately after the ban — the Australian gun buyback should have ended the debate about the effectiveness of gun control.  But since people are so determined to pretend that their lazy, knee-jerk reactions are so helpful, and that one can be a social benefactor simply by supporting some poorly thought out set of rules, now we see ridiculous repetitious references to Australian gun laws, as if they were an overwhelming success
     http://archive.is/FMofP

It needs to be stressed (repeatedly), that one does not need to engage in a long study, collecting data and performing an intensive statistical analysis, to know that prohibitions of any kind do not work.  That a prohibition for a particular activity would be considered at all, means that people are not likely to be deterred from that activity.  Of course, we all know this — we all know that law, in and of itself, does nothing to constrain human behavior.  That is why we see an endless stream of violations of existing laws, including those laws with extreme penalties — e.g. the prohibition of murder.

This is what is so absurd about the gun control debate in general — every discussion contains the absolutely insane assumption that an individual who is willing to commit murder, would weigh a list of prohibitions in some piece of gun legislation — e.g. on magazine sizes, or particular gun types, etc.

Do people honestly believe that an individual who is planning a mass murder, would somehow be restrained by some set of laws that restrict how the murder is committed?   What reasonable person would make such an idiotic claim, when the whole point of such extreme actions is to commit a shocking, newsworthy crime?

And here are two more questions regarding Australia's gun buyback (or any similar gun prohibition) —
  1. Since we know that some people will always violate existing laws, however reasonable, how many people did not turn in prohibited weapons?
  2. And of those who did not turn them in, are they more, or less likely to commit a murder, or sell the weapon to one who would commit a murder?
The point of those two questions should be obvious.  Even though no one can know the answer to question #1 (since criminals do not voluntarily report their criminal activity), the number of prohibited weapons that were not turned in and destroyed is certainly greater than zero, and those individuals who did comply with the law were not the risk factor — i.e. they were law abiding.  So there is one thing we do know conclusivelyevery gun prohibition tips the balance of power in favor of the criminal who does not follow the law.   There is no insight here, and it is sad that this obvious point is in such desperate need of being repeated — law only restricts the law abiding, and so more law only empowers criminals.

Here are two charts from GunPolicy.org, which show the overall suicide and homicide rates (regardless of method) in Australia from about 1990 through 2012.  Notice that the suicide rate increased after the ban, and did not drop below the low it reached before the ban in 1993, until 2003.  And notice that the overall homicide rate barely changed from 1990 to 2000 (Australia's homicide rate was already very low) — both the firearm suicide and homicide rates were dropping, but people were simply switching to other methods --

http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compareyears/10/rate_of_suicide_any_method
http://archive.is/JjzhF

GunPolicy.org, Australia Suicide Rate per 100,000, 1988-2012

http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compareyears/10/rate_of_homicide_any_method
http://archive.is/OwSk8

GunPolicy.org, Australia Homicide Rate per 100,000, 1990-2012



Here is a chart from the 'Australian Institute of Criminology', from their 2012 collection of data, which I also included in my previous post from June of last year.  This chart shows how stable and low Australia's homicide counts have been — again, there wasn't a sudden drop after 1996 (the count went up, along with population, so the rate went down slightly) --

https://aic.gov.au/publications/facts/2012
https://archive.is/7cLiN

Australian Institute of Criminology, Australia Homicide Victims, 1993-2011



And here is a page from a widely cited paper from June 2010, by Andrew Leigh and Christine Neill, regarding the 1996 gun buy back in Australia, 'Do Gun Buybacks Save Lives? Evidence from Panel Data'As I explained in my previous post from last year, the authors of this paper have an obvious agenda, since the data the authors chart does not support their conclusion.  That is, both suicide and homicide rates with firearms were in steady downtrends when Australia's gun buyback began in 1996, and those trends did not change in response to the buyback.  And both non-firearm suicides and homicides increased immediately after the ban — the overall suicide rate actually increased, as shown by the GunPolicy.org chart above, and the overall homicide rate dropped only slightly.   These graphs from the Leigh/Neill paper show the rate of suicides and homicides for firearms vs. non-firearms using 'Australian Bureau of Statistics' data --

http://andrewleigh.org/pdf/GunBuyback_Panel.pdf
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4995.pdf
http://archive.is/fWNHw
Leigh/Neill, Do Gun Buybacks Save Lives? Suicide/Homicide Rates, 1968-2006



Here is the conclusion from that paper — which is obviously false, given that the overall suicide rate increased, while the overall homicide rate barely changed --

http://andrewleigh.org/pdf/GunBuyback_Panel.pdf
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4995.pdf
http://archive.is/fWNHw
In 1997, Australia implemented a gun buyback program that reduced the stock of firearms by around one-fifth. Using differences across states in the number of firearms withdrawn, we test whether the reduction in firearms availability affected firearm homicide and suicide rates.  We find that the buyback led to a drop in the firearm suicide rates of almost 80 per cent, with no statistically significant effect on non-firearm death rates. The estimated effect on firearm homicides is of similar magnitude, but is less precise. The results are robust to a variety of specification checks, and to instrumenting the state-level buyback rate.


Well, if the firearm suicide rate dropped by 'almost 80 per cent, with no statistically significant effect on non-firearm death rates', and the 'estimated effect on firearm homicides is of similar magnitude', how did the overall suicide rate increase, and the overall homicide rate remain basically unchanged?

The conclusion quoted above from the Leigh/Neill paper becomes absurd on its face when one considers that the 1996 Australian gun buyback only applied to certain kinds of rifles, so the new law had no effect on the ability of Australians to commit suicide with a firearm.  It is a total non-sequitur to claim that Australia's 'National Firearms Agreement' would affect firearms suicides, unless you believe that law-abiding Australians had some bizarre penchant for committing suicide with the rifles included in the ban.  And if you look carefully at the scales in the chart above from the Leigh/Neill paper, you'll notice that non-firearm suicides dominate the overall suicide rate.  That is why the overall suicide rate could increase while the firearm suicide rate was in a steady downtrend — Australians have not been prone to committing suicide with a firearm.

It is impossible to look at this data and think that Australia's gun buyback did anything, because nothing that was happening after the gun buyback was not happening before.  Australian taxpayers should be livid, since the Australian government supposedly spent about $500 million on the gun buyback, with $340 million of that going to purchase banned firearms —
     http://archive.is/Y5YfH
     https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net616/f/anao_report_1997-98_25.pdf
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_buyback_program#Australia
     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_laws_in_Australia#Port_Arthur_massacre_and_its_consequences

If only such difficult problems of human nature could be solved by passing such simple rules.

Sunday, October 11, 2015

They Love Pretending At Vox.com

In a previous post, I wrote about a ridiculous article at vox.com by Amanda Taub, in which she attempted to pretend that 'political correctness' does not exist.  That article was fascinating, in that Taub demonstrated the falsity of her own premise.

Here is another article at vox.com, from January 2015, co-written by Amanda Taub and Max Fisher, which has the same delusional quality, and, again, demonstrates the falsity of their premise.

In this article, entitled 'Vox got no threats for posting Charlie Hebdo cartoons, dozens for covering Islamophobia', Fisher and Taub hope to get readers to equate, in their effects on free speech, the many murders committed by Muslims, with the threats Vox.com (among others) has received via social media for reporting on what they call 'Islamophobia' --

http://www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7541095/charlie-hebdo-muslims-threats

Vox got no threats for posting Charlie Hebdo cartoons, dozens for covering Islamophobia
Updated by Max Fisher and Amanda Taub   on January 14, 2015, 2:27 p.m. ET

We were glad that Vox decided to publish the cartoons of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo.  Though their portrayal of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed has offended many Muslims, they are an important part of the story and readers have a right to see them.  We were also glad that we covered the cartoons critically as well as sympathetically, praising them on the grounds of free speech and satire.

The decision of American media organizations to publish or not publish the cartoons has typically been framed of one of bravery or cowardice, based on the assumption that publishing invites physical risk from some number of the 2.6 million Muslim-Americans who will take offense and perhaps action.  Vox.com was praised on MSNBC for its bravery, even though this purported risk did not actually enter into our calculus, and other outlets have presented their decision to publish as a way to defy the Islamist radicals who threaten free speech.

Writers at Vox have indeed been bombarded with threats for our Charlie Hebdo coverage.  But not one of those threats has come from a Muslim or in response to publishing anti-Islam cartoons.  Revealingly, they have rather all come from non-Muslims furious at our articles criticizing Islamophobia.
...


It is interesting to note that Taub and Fisher claim that the 'purported risk did not actually enter into our calculus', in regard to republishing the 'Charlie Hebdo' cartoons, while at the same time they claim to be 'glad that Vox decided to publish the cartoons'.   This begs the obvious question, if they did not believe there was a risk, or they were completely indifferent to it, why would they be glad that the cartoons were republished?   In other words, what is it that they were proud of, or glad about, if they did not believe there was a risk, or they did not believe the risk was worthy of real concern?   (I emphasize republish, to remind readers that vox.com has done nothing original here — they are commenting on the work of others, well after the fact.   'Charlie Hebdo'  took the risk, not vox.com.   It seems like some of the writers at vox.com think they can acquire courage vicariously, by reporting on, and criticizing the work of others.)

Of course, the lead paragraphs quoted above from the Fisher and Taub article are nonsense.  The only reason the 'Charlie Hebdo' cartoons are interesting at all, is because they mock and provoke a large group of religious fundamentalists who regularly resort to violence.  Have you seen any uproar regarding 'Doonesbury' or 'Marmaduke'?  And do you wonder why not?

The contradiction is obvious — if denunciations of Islam for the repeated acts of violence coming from their followers is an indication of an irrational fear of Islam — i.e. a phobia — then why would any writer claim some sort of pride for publishing the 'Charlie Hebdo' cartoons?   That is, if Islam poses no threat, then how is publishing cartoons which mock Islam an act of courage?

And it should come as no surprise, that later in the article, Fisher and Taub give a fairly detailed description of their view of the 'arithmetic of the risk', which supposedly did not enter into their 'calculus'.   So they thought through the 'calculus', but then decided that thinking through it did not constitute an 'entering into our calculus' --

http://www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7541095/charlie-hebdo-muslims-threats

...
Receiving threats of any kind forces journalists to go through the calculation of whether it's likely that they could lead to real harm, and weigh that against the value of writing more on the subject in question.   Any journalist or activist who has written or spoken publicly about a controversial subject will be familiar with the arithmetic of threats and fear.   Add the value of speaking out, subtract the costs of silence.  Multiply by the likelihood that the threats are empty, divide by the chance that they are not.

In our case, that arithmetic works out.  The people who threaten us are crazies and there is no indication that they are representative of any greater whole or are considering doing any more than sending an email.  But we are not the only outlet being targeted, and receiving dozens of threatening emails can have a real effect on journalists, even if we suspect the threats will come to nothing.
...


Obviously, the second sentence in the last paragraph quoted above should have been the focus of the article.

Notice that the 'crazies' that Fisher and Taub are referring to here as an ultimately harmless minority, are what they earlier describe as 'anti-Muslim extremists' who characterize 'Islamophobia'.

Let that sink in for a minute.

So let's summarize, to drive the point home.   Fisher and Taub wrote an article dealing with a group of people who were gunned down by Islamic religious fanatics with automatic weapons (the 'Charlie Hebdo' attack), and in their article they emphasize social media threats which were received from 'anti-Muslims' in response to the reporting on 'Charlie Hebdo' in general, but which threats they then dismissed as giving 'no indication that they are representative of any greater whole or are considering doing any more than sending an email.'

In short, should not that be the real point?   That is, that most religions have violent fanatical elements, but currently Islam presents an especially grave danger, since its followers are so willing to commit violent atrocities as a supposed defense of their religion — whereas others (like the supposed 'anti-Muslims' Fisher and Taub mention) leave it at sending threatening emails.

Begrudgingly, near the end of the article, Fisher and Taub actually acknowledge that shooting someone with a gun is much more serious than an email threat --

http://www.vox.com/2015/1/14/7541095/charlie-hebdo-muslims-threats

...
This is not to argue that the threat from Islamist extremism doesn't exist; as the attacks in Paris demonstrated, this threat is all too real, and has included the actual murders of 17 people, something far beyond the danger of mere email threats.
...


But of course, this begs the obvious question (apart from why they wrote the article to begin with) —
If 'this threat is all too real',  as Fisher and Taub wrote in the paragraph quoted above, why do they repeatedly refer to critics (including in the title of their article) as having a phobia — i.e. Islamohphobia?

Here are some more news events to drive home the point that 'this threat is all too real'.   Those with sympathies for the article written by Max Fisher and Amanda Taub quoted from above, would do well to study these, to remind themselves that devout Muslims are willing to do much worse than send threatening emails, or even shoot people

This site chronicles Islamic violence —
    http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/

A professor of archaeology is beheaded for refusing to cooperate with ISIS —
    http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/18/middleeast/isis-executes-antiquities-expert/

ISIS teens ('caliphate cubs') execute Syrian soldiers before crowds at a Palmyra ruin —
    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3149469/Slaughter-amphitheatre-ISIS-executioners-brutally-shoot-dead-25-Syrian-regime-soldiers-bloodthirsty-crowds-ancient-Palmyra-ruin.html

A child (ISIS teen) beheads a Syrian soldier —
    http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/isis-posts-video-child-beheading-syrian-soldier-article-1.2295914

ISIS blows up a baby as part of a training exercise —
    http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/isis-blown-up-baby-terror-6059342

ISIS drowns 5 prisoners in a cage —
    http://nypost.com/2015/06/24/new-video-shows-isis-slowly-drowning-prisoners-in-a-cage/

ISIS executes 5 mothers and their children by burning them to death —
    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3154672/Iraqi-tribal-chief-recalls-horror-women-children-burnt-death-ISIS-militants-five-brave-mothers-refuse-allow-children-child-soldiers.html

Boko Haram executes 26 civilians by slitting their throats —
    http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/haram-slit-throats-26-civilians-chad-150708171934359.html